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Between the Acts: Federal Court Abstention in the 1940s and ’50s

During the 1940s and ’50s, the federal courts were between the acts. Substantive
due process was finishing its long run, but modern civil rights cases had not fully
occupied the stage.1 Plaintiffs raising race issues in the 1940s did not necessarily
perceive the federal courts as superior to state courts, 2 but saw increased advantages
to a federal trial forum as the 1950s progressed.3
To the extent plaintiffs challenging state and local law sought an original federal
forum—whether in race discrimination or other cases—they might find that various
abstention doctrines obstructed their path. Under such doctrines, federal courts
directed cases to state courts that would otherwise have been within federal subject
matter jurisdiction. In Texas Railroad Commission v. Pullman, for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court abstained when African American Pullman porters raised an equal
protection challenge to the state Commission’s work rule favoring white conductors.
Under Pullman abstention, the federal court awaits a state court determination of an
unclear state law issue—in that case, whether the Commission lacked authority to
enter the order—that might obviate the need to decide a federal constitutional question.4
Other abstention doctrines forbid federal courts from disrupting states’ efforts to
establish a coherent administrative scheme (Burford abstention),5 deciding issues of
state law whose importance transcends the particular case (Thibodaux abstention),6 and
interfering with ongoing state enforcement actions (Younger abstention).7
1.

See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on Histories of Lower
Federal Courts, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 679, 692, 694–95 (1999) (noting the enhanced role of the
federal courts in vindicating federal rights at the turn of the century and later with the Warren Court’s
“centralizing liberal activism”).

2.

See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education,
1925–1950, at 51 (2004) (suggesting that federal courts were not seen as particularly better than state
courts on race issues and indicating that the NAACP filed many graduate student cases in state courts
and many salary equalization cases in federal courts); Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil
Rights 205 (2007) (noting the NAACP’s successes in getting California state courts to forbid
maintenance of both a closed shop and a closed union).

3.

See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 n.* (1954) (involving three cases from federal courts
and one from a state court); Tushnet, supra note 2, at 151 & n.28 (noting facilities segregation cases
pending at the time of Brown, which were in federal courts); Jack Greenberg, Race Relations and
American Law 9–10 (1959) (discussing overall superiority of federal courts on race issues); see also
Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 688, 703 (1989) (reviewing Paul M. Bator et al.,
Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System (3d ed. 1988)) (stating that
the vision of state and federal courts as fungible was undermined by Brown and its progeny).

4.

R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941); see also id. at 498 (indicating that the
Pullman Company and the railroads brought the suit, in which porters intervened).

5.

See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317, 334 (1943) (directing to state court an oil company’s state
and federal-law based challenge to a state agency’s alleged over-allocation of drilling rights to a small
producer); see also infra text accompanying notes 50–54 (discussing Burford).

6.

See La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30–31 (1959) (directing the lower federal
courts to await a determination by the state supreme court as to whether the city was authorized under
state law to expropriate utility company property within the city).

7.

See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52–53 (1971) (refusing to entertain a defendant’s challenge to a state
criminal syndicalism law). This article is somewhat more focused on Pullman abstention than other
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By deflecting and delaying decisions by the federal judiciary, these jurisdictional
decisions advanced the Progressive and New Deal substantive agenda of reducing
federal court invalidation of state law—an agenda formed in reaction to decisions
such as Lochner v. New York.8 In particular, Ed Purcell has ably shown that Felix
Frankfurter, as a scholar and judge, saw procedural and jurisdictional decisions as
instruments to effectuate such substantive policy goals.9
This article aims to make a modest addition to prior scholarship by showing
ways in which the reasoning supporting abstention corresponded to the Court’s
reasoning in substantive decisions as to the validity of statutes. Part of this overlap
was the emphasis on judicial restraint and institutional competence,10 as other
scholars have noted.11 These broad principles supported not only federal court
types, but because the doctrines of abstention and the reasoning supporting them were not altogether
distinct during the period under study, this article is not limited solely to Pullman abstention. Younger
abstention, however, is not a central focus. For the classic article focusing on the cases preceding Younger,
see Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 636 (1979). While Professor Laycock shows that federal courts’ declining equitable
jurisdiction when plaintiffs challenged state criminal statutes was a less pervasive practice than many
had supposed, id. at 636, 642–44, this article suggests that other types of abstention may have been
somewhat more prevalent than is currently appreciated.
8.

198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, state legislation
limiting bakery employee hours to ten hours a day and sixty hours a week). The Lochner Era, running
roughly from the late 1890s to the late 1930s, was characterized by the federal courts’ overturning social
and economic legislation based on implied limitations on government power. See Laurence H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 567 (2d ed. 1988).

9.

Purcell, supra note 1, at 683–84 (stating that the agenda of Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The
Business of the Supreme Court (1928), “included constraining the reach of the conservative Supreme
Court, limiting the ability of corporate litigants to exploit federal jurisdiction, abolishing the doctrine
of Swift v. Tyson (1842), blocking passage of the proposed federal declaratory judgment act, expanding
substantially the issues on which the lower federal courts would defer to state courts, and justifying a
series of progressive legislative proposals to restrict the jurisdiction and alter the structure of the national
judiciary” (footnote omitted)); id. at 684–86 (discussing how Frankfurter’s seemingly neutral scientific
and professional approach helped to obscure this progressive agenda); see also Stephen Gardbaum, New
Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 483, 565 (1997) (stating that
New Deal constitutionalism viewed “the activist federal courts as the chief culprits of the previous era
and, as a result, reallocated power from them to state and federal legislatures—and to state courts—by
substantially reducing the scope of judicial review”).

10.

Institutional competencies refers not only to the notion that one body may make better decisions than
another as to fact, law, or policy, but also that it may more appropriately or legitimately make those
decisions. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to
Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law, at lx (1994) (characterizing institutional competency arguments: “In a
government seeking to advance the public interest, each organ has a special competence or expertise,
and the key to good government is not just figuring out what is the best policy, but figuring out which
institutions should be making which decisions and how all the institutions should interrelate.”).

11.

See, e.g., Amar, supra note 3, at 694, 696 (discussing the link between notions of fungibility of state and
federal courts and the legal process school’s emphasis on institutional competencies); cf. Purcell, supra
note 1, at 705 n.76 (noting that while Louis Brandeis and Frankfurter helped to inspire legal process
jurisprudence, both were less concerned with abstract legal philosophy and more concerned with
practical and political issues inseparable from progressive values); Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix
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deference to state legislatures when reviewing the validity of state regulation, but
also undergirded federal court abstention in favor of state court review of state
regulation in the first instance. This parallel reasoning manifested itself not only at
the general level of emphasizing institutional competencies and judicial restraint, but
also in some of the more specific techniques that implemented those concepts. For
example, the Court increasingly relied on social facts—such as those that had
appeared in Brandeis briefs—to provide the substantive justification for legislation; it
also relied on the importance of social facts as a reason for abstention.12 The technique
of testing the validity of legislation by imagining a possible state of facts that might
support it, or by balancing governmental interests against what were previously more
absolute rights,13 also had cognates when the Court justified abstention.14
This article also shows that, reinforced by such reasoning, the abstention doctrine
at mid-century appeared to be heading in the direction of requiring exceptional
circumstances not to abstain when plaintiffs contested state and local regulation.
Because abstention subsists and continues to evoke academic criticism,15 it may be
easy to forget how pervasive a doctrine abstention threatened to become.
Some justices, however, resisted application of these accepted aspects of substantive
legal reasoning to the federal jurisdictional sphere. Civil rights cases would contribute
considerably to reining in abstention.16 Not coincidentally then, it was roughly
contemporaneous with Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech that the
abstention doctrine started to become the more marginal doctrine that it is today.
Part I of this article discusses the origins of the abstention doctrines in the
Progressive and New Deal desire to rein in federal courts’ invalidation of regulation.
Part II discusses how the reasoning supporting abstention paralleled that used in
Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our Federalism”, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 697, 743–44 (1993) (discussing
Frankfurter’s thought and its inf luence on judicial federalism); id. at 777, 780–81, 783 (discussing
Frankfurter’s inf luence on the Erie doctrine (derived from Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)), the Pullman abstention doctrine, and the interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act); see 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
12.

See infra text accompanying notes 34–55.

13.

See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (rejecting Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to restrictions on the work of opticians, based on imagining possible health
reasons the legislature may have had for the restriction); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 444–45 (1934) (rejecting a contract clause challenge to a mortgage moratorium by, in effect,
balancing the right against the needs of society). See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional
Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943, 948–63 (1987) (discussing the rise of balancing); id. at
964 (discussing Blaisdell as a balancing case).

14.

See infra text accompanying notes 56–68 (discussing any state of facts reasoning); infra text accompanying
notes 69–98 (discussing balancing).

15.

See, e.g., Peter W. Low et al., Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-State Relations 770
(7th ed. 2011) (collecting authority).

16.

See Amar, supra note 3, at 702–03 (indicating that Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), “called
into question every central tenet of the legal process theory” manifest in the first edition of Henry M.
Hart & Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System (1953)) [hereinafter
Hart & Wechsler I].
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determining the constitutionality of statutes. Part III shows that the abstention
doctrines were less distinct from one another than they are today, and that abstention
appeared to have the potential to become a general default doctrine for cases
challenging state and local regulation. Part IV traces resistance to abstention, and
the reasoning supporting it, from Justice William O. Douglas and like-minded
justices. Part V shows how these justices helped to limit abstention to special
categories and traces the decline of the doctrine, in part spurred by civil rights cases.
I.	BACKGROUND

It is generally appreciated that the abstention doctrines were a reaction to the
Lochner Court’s substantive constitutional doctrines,17 and the perceived increase in
federal equity jurisdiction to entertain anticipatory challenges to state regulation
ushered in by Ex parte Young.18 An additional contributing factor was Erie’s rejection
of the federal courts’ power to confect general common law in diversity,19 which
undermined federal courts’ confidence in deciding state law issues that might arise in
the course of challenges to state regulation.20
Congressional legislation limiting federal court jurisdiction over challenges to
state and local regulation followed soon after Ex parte Young.21 In addition to provisions
for three-judge courts beginning in 1910, 22 a 1913 statute required federal courts to
stay proceedings to enjoin state statutes and administrative orders provided the state
commenced an enforcement suit in state court prior to the federal court’s final hearing,
and provided the state courts supplied relief from the statute or order pending the
state court determination.23 The act had little effect, however, because states were

17.

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

18.

209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allowing an equity action where the government threatened to bring actions in
state court to enforce an allegedly unconstitutional law); see, e.g., McManamon, supra note 11, at 784
(indicating that Frankfurter attempted to destroy Ex parte Young by Pullman abstention and by
“breath[ing] new life into the Anti-Injunction Act”); Charles Warren, Federal and State Court
Interference, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 375 (1930) (arguing that allowing an injunction under Ex parte
Young violated the spirit of the Anti-Injunction Act).

19.

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

20. See, e.g., McManamon, supra note 11, at 744–49 (discussing Frankfurter’s inf luential arguments for

limiting pendent jurisdiction); id. at 749–51 (discussing Frankfurter’s arguments that Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) led to nonuniformity); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial
Federalism and the Administrative States, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 613, 648 (1999) (discussing Erie’s influence
on abstention doctrine).

21.

Hart & Wechsler I, supra note 16, at 854 (noting a “series of efforts, both legislative and judicial, to
effect a partial shift to state courts from federal trial courts of litigation of the type of Ex parte Young”).

22.

Id. at 848–49 (discussing three-judge-court provisions of 1910, 1913, 1925, and 1948).

23.

Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 160, 37 Stat. 1013. The provision apparently did not evoke significant debate.
See Welch Pogue, State Determination of State Law and the Judicial Code, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 623, 626–27
(1928).
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unwilling to supply the required pendente lite relief. 24 Undaunted, Frankfurter, 25
Charles Warren, 26 Frankfurter’s students, and others27 persistently argued in the
1920s and ’30s that virtually all challenges to state regulation should be heard in the
first instance in state courts.28 They bemoaned the “hasty assumption of [federal]
jurisdiction in suits to test the constitutionality of state statutes before the corporation
affected has [resorted] to remedies afforded by state laws,”29 and recommended that
“the road to the protection of constitutional rights lay to the Supreme Court from the
state courts.”30
Congress went a long way toward implementing the proposed jurisdictional shift
to state courts with the Rate and Tax Injunction Acts of 1934 and 1937, which
respectively directed challenges to state and local rates, and taxes to the state courts.31
Frankfurter helped send state courts some of the remaining cases challenging state
and local regulation beginning with his decision in Texas Railroad Commission v.
Pullman, Co. 32 In that case, the Court withheld a determination of whether the
Commission’s order channeling certain work from black Pullman porters to white
conductors violated the equal protection clause, pending a determination by the state
courts of whether the Commission had power under state law to issue the order.
With Pullman, said the Harvard Law Review, “the court enunciated a doctrine
potentially as significant as the overthrow of Swift v. Tyson and one which evidences
24.

See Hart & Wechsler I, supra note 16, at 854 (“The provision has been largely ineffectual.”); see also
Note, The Pullman Case: A Limitation on the Business of the Federal Courts, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1379, 1382
n.18 (1941) (“Up to 1937, only four states had adopted the necessary enabling statutes.”).

25.

See, e.g., Purcell, supra note 1, at 698–706 (discussing Frankfurter’s works); McManamon, supra note 11,
at 740–41 (discussing the works of Frankfurter and James M. Landis that appeared in the Harvard Law
Review from 1925 to 1927, which became The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States—A Study
in the Federal Judicial System (1928)).

26. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 18.
27.

See, e.g., Pogue, supra note 23, at 623 n.* (indicating the paper was originally prepared for Frankfurter’s
class); John E. Lockwood et al., The Use of the Federal Injunction in Constitutional Litigation, 43 Harv. L.
Rev. 426, 426 n.a1 (1930) (expressing indebtedness to Frankfurter); McManamon, supra note 11, at 754
n.338 (listing papers published by Frankfurter’s students and acolytes).

28. Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 Cornell L.

Q. 499, 517 (1928); Lockwood et al., supra note 27, at 454 (proposing that federal equity be unavailable
so long as there is an adequate remedy in state courts, legal or equitable); Warren, supra note 18, at 378
(arguing that federal courts should be more willing to refuse jurisdiction where litigation can more
satisfactorily be dealt with by state courts).

29. Warren, supra note 18, at 346.
30. Frankfurter, supra note 28, at 519.
31.

These acts deprived the federal district courts of jurisdiction to entertain most actions to enjoin state
and local taxes and utility rates, so long as a “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” was available in state
court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341–1342 (2006). The prohibitions on jurisdiction extended to most constitutional
challenges. See id.

32.

312 U.S. 496 (1941). The principal predecessor to Pullman was Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit
Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929), discussed in McManamon, supra note 11, at 781.
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an effort to minimize the area of conflict between the federal judiciary and the
states.”33
II.	TIES OF SUBSTANTIVE AND JURISDICTIONAL REASONING

A. Sociological, Fact-Based Jurisprudence

Abstention minimized the role of federal courts in invalidating state and local
regulation and relied on reasoning that paralleled substantive constitutional doctrine.
As to substantive methodology, the Progressive and New Deal Eras characteristically
employed a sociological jurisprudence that emphasized social facts that helped justify
legislation that might have been invalidated under more formalist notions. 34
“Whether a law enacted in the exercise of the police power is justly subject to the
charge of being unreasonable or arbitrary,” stated Justice Louis Brandeis, “can
ordinarily be determined only by a consideration of the contemporary conditions,
social, industrial and political, of the community to be affected thereby. Resort to
such facts is necessary . . . in order to appreciate the evils sought to be remedied and
the possible effects of the remedy proposed.”35
Even as Progressive and New Deal Era judges relied on social facts to justify
legislation, the extent of their exploration of real-world facts could span a continuum.
At one end was judicial scrutiny of actual justificatory facts, such as the Court’s

33.

Note, supra note 24, at 1380; see also id. at 1385 (noting that Pullman had virtually the same effect as
refusing “to enjoin enforcement of state orders in cases of doubt”); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842) (applying a general common law in a commercial case in diversity). The Court abandoned the
general common law in diversity in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), making state law
more pervasively the law that the federal courts applied in diversity cases.

34. See Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 948–63 (discussing the rise of balancing as a reaction to Lochnerism);

id. at 954 (indicating that Progressives were self-consciously attentive to facts and social conditions);
Purcell, supra note 1, at 702 (discussing Frankfurter’s belief that “‘knowledge of [] facts’ was ‘the
foundation of constitutional judgment’”). This is not to say that formalist approaches ignored facts and
consequences. See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1089, 1099–1126 (2000) (indicating that formalism, “rooted in consequentialist concerns,” and
in commerce clause jurisprudence, was a conscious strategy for maintaining principled boundaries
between the state and federal spheres and promoting the free interchange of goods).

35.

Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 356–57 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Aleinikoff, supra note
13, at 954 (discussing the call for attention to facts and pragmatism); Felix Frankfurter & Nathan
Greene, The Labor Injunction 179–80 (1930) (praising Brandeis’s dissent in Truax); Frankfurter
& Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 192 n.29 (1928) (applauding the “application of a
new technique in constitutional argument wherein an appreciation of facts is the decisive element”);
Purcell, supra note 1, at 702–03 (citing to Frankfurter and Landis’s emphasis on knowledge of the facts,
including the “facts of industrial life” as the basis for constitutional decisions, and also noting
Frankfurter’s urging that the Supreme Court should not be a fact finder); Melvin I. Urofsky, The Failure
of Felix Frankfurter, 26 U. Rich. L. Rev. 175, 187 (1991) (suggesting that a description that would fit
Frankfurter’s teaching of constitutional law would include “emphasis on process, . . . on peculiarities, on
cases, . . . on resolving competing considerations, on watching for practicalities not likely to be expressed
in opinions,” citing to what Thomas Reed Powell said of his own teaching, in Laura Kalman, Legal
Realism at Yale, 1927–1960, at 51 (1986)).
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reliance on the poor bargaining power of women to uphold a state minimum wage.36
At the other end was judicial indifference to real-world facts manifested in the formula
that the Court would uphold economic legislation if a reasonably imaginable state of
facts would support it.37 Approaching the latter end of the spectrum was an emphasis
on facts mysteriously accessible to legislatures and agencies, but not to reviewing
federal judges.38 In Osborn v. Ozlin, for example, in rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment
attack on a law requiring that Virginia insurance agents receive at least half of the
commissions on any insurance policy covering Virginia risks, Frankfurter recited facts
about the insurance industry and various other aspects of Virginia’s insurance
regulation,39 none of which suggested any particular problem the legislation addressed.
But the legislation was “not to be judged by abstracting an isolated contract written in
New York from the organic whole of the insurance business, the effect of that business
on Virginia, and Virginia’s regulation of it.”40 Similarly, in rejecting a contracts clause
challenge to New York’s 1943 continuation of an earlier foreclosure moratorium
despite improved financial conditions, Frankfurter reasoned that “when a widely
diffused public interest has become enmeshed in a network of multitudinous private
arrangements,” the state’s authority “is not to be gainsaid by abstracting one such
arrangement from its public context and treating it as though it were an isolated
private contract constitutionally immune from impairment.”41

36. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937) (discussing the poor bargaining

power of women, and that the legislature was entitled to adopt measures to reduce the evils). See generally
Gerald Gunther & Kathleen Sullivan, Constitutional Law 477 (13th ed. 1997) (indicating
that the West Coast Hotel opinion contained “explanations of the rationales for the challenged laws”).

37.

See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153–54 (1938) (“[T]he constitutionality of a
statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the
court that those facts have ceased to exist.” (citing Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924)),
although also stating that “where the legislative judgment is drawn in question [the inquiry] must be
restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed
affords support for it”). Commentators generally see Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S.
483 (1955) as manifesting the extreme deference characteristic of modern review.
Indifference to supportive facts does not have to suggest that the Court sees state legislatures (or
state courts) as superior fact finders, but rather may indicate that the Court sees these bodies as more
legitimately deciding whether state legislation is justified by social conditions. Cf. Cushman, supra note
34, at 1144–45 (stating that the import of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), was that a “record
that had been utterly inadequate for an empirical, judicial assessment of the effect was perfectly adequate
for a legislative determination”). Reference to superior fact finding abilities, however, could complement
legitimacy concerns; both may be aspects of institutional competency arguments. See Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 10, at lxi.

38. Cf. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 126 (1944) (“Myriad forms of

service relationship, with infinite and subtle variations in the terms of employment, blanket the nation’s
economy.”).

39.

310 U.S 53, 61–62 (1940).

40. Id. at 63; cf. Louis L. Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 357, 395

(1949) (noting Frankfurter’s resistance to code-like formulations).

41.

E. N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945).
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Such fact-mysticism in substantive review translated to jurisdictional allocation
decisions as well. At first blush, state courts would not evidently have institutional
competency superior to federal courts in determining facts, as opposed to determining
state law. But perhaps partly as a result of seeing state courts as sharing in state
lawmaking,42 some Progressives saw the state courts as having access to inarticulable
knowledge of local facts that the federal courts lacked.43 In urging a decreased role
for the federal courts, Frankfurter argued that federal courts would have trouble
giving “meaning to isolated and frequently obscure expressions of state policy, behind
which may lie unexpressed assumptions familiar to the state judges.”44 Cases involving
the validity of state statutes and regulation thus should proceed through state courts,
said a like-minded commentator, because:
[T]he state courts would seem potentially better able to find [] facts by reason
of their greater proximity to them. Most constitutional issues involve a close
examination of the situation with which the statute deals. What this situation
is, the reasons for the legislation, and the effect it will have, may lie deep in
the roots of local peculiarities.45

If constitutional challenges to state law made their way through the state courts, said
another:
The state courts could have woven into the statute or order assailed an
interpretation based on local laws, conditions, and history, essential in many
cases to an understanding of the real meaning and operation of the statute or
order, and known perhaps best and perhaps only to the state courts.46

This volksgeist approach to both substantive review and jurisdictional allocation
was evident in the cases restricting federal review of the Texas Railroad Commission’s
allocation of drilling rights in the Texas oil fields. In Railroad Commission v. Rowan
42.

See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 20, at 652 (noting inf luence of line-blurring between state
legislatures, agencies, and courts).

43.

See Frankfurter, supra note 28, at 517 (noting that business regulation and tax cases turn “largely on
voluminous facts, deriving significance from judgment on social and economic policy” and arguing for
such cases to be heard in state courts). Indeed, according to Frankfurter, even utility regulation cases
almost always involved the interpretation of “local laws and local contracts, not within the special
competence of federal judges.” Id. at 519; see also Purcell, supra note 1, at 686 (stating that Frankfurter
urged that “essentially local” matters should be heard in the state courts).

44. Frankfurter, supra note 28, at 518; id. at 519 (arguing that if cases challenging state and local regulation

came to the Court through the state courts, “all state matters would be concluded, and the special local
facts upon which constitutional questions now so frequently turn would, in the first instance, be
canvassed by judges presumably most familiar with them” (footnote omitted)); see also McManamon,
supra note 11, at 736 (noting Frankfurter and Landis’s statement that litigation involving state legislation
unfairly required the Court to be aware of local facts); id. at 781 (stating that Frankfurter “was concerned
that the federal courts were ill-equipped to interpret complex state statutory schemes”). But cf. David E.
Lilienthal, The Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public Utilities, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 422–24
(1930) (arguing that local law and contracts were rarely at issue in utility cases).

45.

Lockwood et al., supra note 27, at 451; cf. id. at 428, 451 (arguing that the Court needed the assistance
of state courts that have “special knowledge” of state law).

46. Pogue, supra note 23, at 630.
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& Nichols Oil Co., the company challenged as confiscatory the Commission’s system
giving low-capacity wells near-equal allocations as productive wells.47 Frankfurter,
however, reduced due process review to a minimum, first giving a fact-laden
discussion of Texas drilling regulation and relying on the “inherent empiricism”48 of
attempted solutions to common-pool allocation issues. Any particular order was “but
one more item in a continuous series of adjustments”49 by the Commission. Justice
Hugo Black’s opinion in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., inaugurating Burford abstention,
used similar reasoning. The Commission had issued a permit to Burford to drill four
wells on a 2.33 acre plot, which the owners of larger neighboring tracts claimed
allowed the confiscation of their oil.50 According to Black’s decision directing
abstention, the Commission’s “series of adjustments”51 would only be confounded by
federal court participation. He piled on factual detail about the Texas oil fields, not
in an attempt to find a discernible pattern in such state court adjustments, but
seemingly because such detail self-evidently showed that oil allocation issues were
better left to state courts.52 While Frankfurter dissented in Burford,53 he later wrote
the abstention decision in Louisiana Power & Light v. City of Thibodaux, reasoning
that eminent domain issues “normally turn on legislation with much local variation
interpreted in local settings.”54
Justices’ assuming state court superiority in determining the social conditions
justifying regulation was not limited to economic due process challenges. Knowledge
of the problems that legislation was meant to address could be a reason for allowing
47.

310 U.S. 573, 577 (1940) (indicating that after first allocating twenty barrels per day to the low-capacity
wells, the Commission determined that—given what remained of the total to be extracted—only
twenty-two barrels per day could be allocated to productive wells).

48. Id. at 579–80. The Rowan decision effectively overruled Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S.

55 (1937). See Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 881, 984–
88 (2005) (discussing Thompson). The Court there evaluated for itself the purpose of a particular
proration order and found it was not designed to prevent waste or confiscation, but rather was meant to
compel some producers to buy gas from others. Thompson, 300 U.S. at 77–79.

49. Rowan, 310 U.S. at 584. In denying rehearing, the Court declined to hear pendent state law issues. 311

U.S. 614, 615 (1940).

50. Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 124 F.2d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1941), rev’d on rehearing, 130 F.2d 10 (5th Cir.

1942), rev’d, 319 U.S. 315 (1943).

51.

Burford, 319 U.S. at 332 (citing Rowan, 310 U.S. at 584).

52.

Id. at 318–24; see also Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 349 (1951) (abstaining with
respect to an order requiring continuation of unremunerative local service challenged on federal and
state grounds, and stating: “As adequate state court review of an administrative order based upon
predominantly local factors is available to appellee, intervention of a federal court is not necessary for
the protection of federal rights.” (footnote omitted)).

53.

319 U.S. at 336, 340 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that because Congress had resisted efforts to
restrict diversity outside of the rate context and state law standards were clear, abstention was
inappropriate); see also Jaffe, supra note 40, at 381 (“Pullman is a better guide to . . . Justice[]
[Frankfurter’s] philosophy than his dissent in Burford.”); Hart & Wechsler I, supra note 16, at 873
(attributing Frankfurter’s Burford dissent in part to the constitutional issues’ being minor).

54. 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
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states the initial decision on claims that we would now characterize as calling for
more scrutiny. For example, in Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, in which a private
school challenged on Fifth Amendment grounds a territorial law restricting foreign
language instruction of younger children, the Court ordered dismissal as a matter of
equitable discretion. The Court stated:
We think that where equitable interference with state and territorial acts is
sought in federal courts, judicial consideration of acts of importance primarily
to the people of a state or territory should, as a matter of discretion, be left by
the federal courts to the courts of the legislating authority unless exceptional
circumstances command a different course. We find no such circumstances in
this case.55

B. Any State of Facts to Which the Law Might Constitutionally Be Applied

The institutional competency arguments that supported greater reliance on state
courts had their more obvious application where state law, as opposed to the underlying
facts justifying state law, was at issue. After all, Erie made state courts the more
definitive expositors of state law.56 In Pullman, sending the case to state court was
justified by the existence of a plausible narrowing construction that the state courts
might give to the Commission’s state law authority.57 And Pullman continues to have
currency for cases in which an obviously available interpretation of state law might
obviate a federal court’s having to decide a federal constitutional issue.
The 1940s Court, however, did not necessarily require that the narrowing
interpretation be obvious when abstaining. Rather, the Court took the “any state of
facts” notion for upholding the constitutionality of economic legislation 58 and
transferred that notion to jurisdictional allocation decisions. Translated to abstention,
the reasoning was that state courts should be given the opportunity to review the
legislation ahead of the federal court, so long as there were any state of facts to which
the legislation could apply without offense to federal law. “When a statute is assailed as
unconstitutional,” said the Court in declining to decide a case on direct review, “we are
bound to assume the existence of any state of facts which would sustain the statute in
55.

336 U.S. 368, 383–84 (1949); id. at 373 (indicating the plaintiffs claimed a violation of the Fifth
Amendment by the interference with the use of their property); cf. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. United
States, 355 U.S. 534, 546, 552 (1958) (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J. & Burton, J.)
(arguing for abstention in a preemption case, and adverting to special problems faced by California).

56. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
57.

See Lauren Robel, Riding the Color Line: The Story of Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., in
Federal Courts Stories 163, 171 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnick eds., 2010) (stating that
according to the company’s complaint, the Commission lacked authority to regulate services as
distinguished from rates); id. at 180 (noting the company’s argument from a Texas case that “abuses”
had to be statutorily defined).

58. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. The any state of facts notion was also used for legal sufficiency

of the complaint. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (“[A] complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”). But cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007) (retiring the Conley formula).
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whole or in part.”59 And because state courts were the only forums that could definitively
make such narrowing interpretations, resort to state court was frequently called for.60
Such any state of facts reasoning for jurisdictional decisions survives, particularly as
to Younger abstention, where it reinforces the requirement of extraordinary circumstances
for federal court interference with an ongoing state criminal proceeding.61 The Court,
however, used any state of facts notions in directing Pullman abstention as well, leading
to abstention in cases when the possible saving interpretations by state courts often
seemed much more far-fetched than in Pullman. In several cases, the Court reasoned
that a state court might hold a statute to apply only to intrastate commerce, thus mooting
commerce clause and preemption challenges. In Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin,
for example, the Court abstained on that ground with respect to a commerce clause
challenge to a state tax that applied to the “privilege of carrying on or doing business
within the state.”62 And in American Federation of Labor v. Watson, the Court held that
the lower court should have abstained rather than upholding Florida’s right to work law,
again, because it was possible that Florida might construe the provisions to cover only
employees not covered by the National Labor Relations Act63—i.e., only employees
whose labor disputes would not affect interstate commerce.64
59.

Ala. State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 465 (1945). Justice Black had used similar language
in directing that the federal courts not hear most of ASCAP’s challenge to a Florida law restricting
copyright holders from entering price-fixing agreements. See Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)
(stating that this was not a case in which a “statute might be flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against
whomever an effort might be made to apply it”).

60. Cf. Frankfurter, supra note 28, at 518 (indicating that constitutional controversies often required a

construction of state law).

61.

See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971) (citing the language in Buck, 313 U.S. at 402, as to a
completely unconstitutional statute, as a possible exception to the usual prohibition on obtaining a
federal injunction against a pending prosecution). The Court has used similar language in rejecting
certain types of “facial” challenges. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (rejecting the
challenge to the federal bail statute on the merits); cf. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960)
(stating that persons to whom the act could constitutionally be applied “will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional”). The Court’s use of any state of facts
reasoning in abstention cases, however, included cases in which plaintiffs claimed that the statute could
not constitutionally be applied to their own conduct. See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin,
323 U.S. 101, 102–03 (1944) (indicating the tax commissioner had determined that the tax applied to
Spector and assessed the tax for the years 1937 to 1940); id. (indicating Spector claimed that the statute
could not constitutionally be deemed to apply).

62. 323 U.S. at 102; see also Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 605, 610 (1951) (holding

the statute unconstitutional after state courts had held that the plaintiff was subject to the tax).

63. 327 U.S. 582, 598 (1946); see also id. at 598–99 (directing federal court to retain jurisdiction pending

state determination).

64. See Ala. State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 464 (1945) (dismissing certiorari in part based

on discretion not to take jurisdiction in declaratory judgment suits and also based on the possibility that
the state might hold that state union registration requirements would only apply with respect to workers
whose labor disputes would not affect interstate commerce).
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Other abstention cases, while not using the possibility of an intrastate commerceonly interpretation, alluded to similarly unlikely narrowing interpretations. In City of
Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., the “important question of [state] law” as to which
the federal courts would be making a mere “prediction” was whether a city’s
requirement that milk be sold in “standard milk bottles” might be interpreted to
allow sale in paper cartons.65 And in Stainback,66 when a private school challenged a
territorial law providing that foreign languages could be taught to students under
certain ages only if specific conditions obtained,67 the Court dismissed the case, inter
alia, on the ground that the Hawaii courts had not yet construed the act, without
mentioning how the statute might be narrowed.68
C. Balancing

The sociological jurisprudence that purported to look to real-world facts to justify
legislation was tied to balancing as a technique for resolving substantive constitutional
issues—a development ably analyzed by Alexander Aleinikoff.69 For adherents to
this style of legal analysis, the “absolutes of the past had to yield to experience and
the social facts of the day.”70 Similarly, jurisdictional allocations should give way to
social facts. The allocation of jurisdiction was an “empiric process,” 71 that should
change with the particular needs of the day.72 The distribution of powers between
65.

316 U.S. 168, 169–72 (1942). In subsequent proceedings, the Illinois Supreme Court held, “It is
inescapable that the words ‘standard milk bottles’ as used in this ordinance means the familiar glass
milk bottles in common usage when it was adopted and cannot be construed to include ‘paper single
service containers.’” Dean Milk Co. v. City of Chicago, 53 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ill. 1944). The Illinois
Supreme Court also held that the ordinance was reasonable as a matter of Illinois law. Id. at 618–19; see
also id. at 614–15 (discussing the prior federal litigation). Although Justice Douglas authored the Court’s
opinion in Fieldcrest, he would become increasingly hostile to abstention. See infra note 126.

66. Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1948); id. at 372–73 (noting lack of criminal sanctions);

see also Charles Alan Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts 170 n.6 (1963) (treating
Stainback as a Pullman case).

67.

The student would have to have passed the fourth grade and a standard English test, or passed the
eighth grade, or attained fifteen years of age. Stainback, 336 U.S. at 372 n.4.

68. Id. at 380–83.
69. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 13 (discussing the rise of balancing as a method of constitutional

reasoning).

70. Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 954 (referring to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes); cf. United Pub. Workers

of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95 (1947) (reasoning that “fundamental human rights are not absolutes”
in upholding the constitutionality of the Hatch Act). Formalist jurisprudence did not ignore facts, see
generally Cushman, supra note 34, but tended to use facts with a view more to proper categorization
than to balancing. See Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 950–51.

71.

Frankfurter, supra note 28, at 514 (referring to diversity jurisdiction).

72. See id. at 506; see also id. at 503 (“That the wisdom of 1875 [the year Congress provided for general

federal question jurisdiction] is the exact measure of wisdom for today is most unlikely.”); id. (“[The]
specific functions [of the federal courts] ought to submit to the judgment of appropriateness to the needs
and sentiments of the time.”); Purcell, supra note 1, at 698–99 (arguing that Frankfurter’s seemingly
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different courts “can be determined neither on a priori reasoning, nor by unchanging
political considerations.” 73
In the case of jurisdictional determinations, the absolutism of the past consisted
in positing a right to a federal forum. The earlier Court had sometimes articulated
the ability to invoke federal jurisdiction as effectively being a constitutional right,74
including in utility regulation challenges that proved such an irritant to Progressives.75
Frankfurter and Charles Warren, however, argued that any right to invoke federal
jurisdiction was statutory.76 Such deconstitutionalization not only meant that
Congress had no duty to give federal courts jurisdiction,77 but also suggested that the
federal courts had a less insistent duty to exercise the jurisdiction given. Rather, the
federal courts could use their discretion78 to balance the litigant’s claim to a federal
forum against the interests of the court system, the states, or society more generally.
Warren criticized Ex parte Young-style anticipatory actions for valuing “the right of
an individual to resort to the federal court more highly than the right of a state to
resort to its own courts.”79 And as Justice Wiley B. Rutledge stated in lauding the
laudatory language for the enhanced role of the federal courts under the 1875 statute should rather be
read as critical of the resultant docket pressures, and thus as pointing to jurisdictional restrictions).
73. Frankfurter, supra note 28, at 506.
74.

See, e.g., Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922) (invalidating a state law revoking a
foreign corporation’s license to do in-state business if the corporation resorted to federal court, and
referring to “the federal constitutional right of . . . foreign corporation[s] to resort to . . . federal courts”),
discussed in Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction
in Industrial America, 1870–1958, at 205–07 (1992); Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 20, at
638–40 (stating that the Court sometimes referred to diversity jurisdiction as a constitutional right); see
also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution 83–84 (2000)
(detailing arguments by businesses that diversity was a constitutional right, in response to Senator
George Norris’s 1931 proposal to abolish diversity jurisdiction).

75. See, e.g., Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 391 (1894); cf. R.R. & Warehouse

Comm’n of Minn. v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 273 U.S. 625, 628–29 (1927) (rejecting an argument that the
railroad had to resort to state court for review of a rate order alleged to be confiscatory, stating, “the
plaintiff if it prefers to entrust the final decision to the Courts of the United States rather than those of
the State has a right to do so”).

76. See, e.g., Frankfurter & Greene, supra note 35, at 214 (arguing that there was clearly not a

constitutional right to a federal forum); Warren, supra note 18, at 375 (indicating that a right to test the
constitutionality of a state law in federal courts was possessed “only by virtue of the provisions of the
federal statutes”); see also Amar, supra note 3, at 696 (indicating that legal process reasoning, manifest in
the first edition of Hart & Wechsler, saw the federal courts “as fungible with state courts,” and
“wholly dependent on Congress” for jurisdiction); Purcell, supra note 1, at 689 n.30, 699 (discussing
Frankfurter’s emphasis on Congress as the source of federal jurisdiction).

77.

Frankfurter, supra note 28, at 514 (“The constitutional grant of judicial power has never implied a duty
by Congress to employ it.”).

78. Some discretion was already thought to inhere in equitable jurisdiction. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Williams,

294 U.S. 176, 185 (1935) (relying on equitable discretion in holding that the district court should have
declined jurisdiction in favor of state liquidation procedures for an insolvent state building and loan).

79. Warren, supra note 18, at 375 (crediting the thought to Justice John Marshall Harlan); cf. Ex parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123, 182 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Surely, the right of a State to invoke the
jurisdiction of its own courts is not less than the right of individuals to invoke the jurisdiction of a
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various manifestations80 of the “policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional
issues,”81 “[e]xecution [of the policy] has involved a continuous choice between the
obvious advantages it produces for the functioning of government in all its coordinate
parts and the very real disadvantages, for the assurance of rights, which deferring
decision very often entails.”82
One of the principal advantages of the federal forum for the party invoking
federal equity, according to then-contemporary commentators, was the “facility and
speed with which temporary relief may be obtained in a meritorious case.” 83
Arguments for abstention sometimes treated the delay to the plaintiff caused by
abstention as a cost that was overbalanced by federalism concerns. As the Court said
in Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., “Considerations of delay, inconvenience, and cost to the
parties, which have been urged upon us, do not call for a different result. For we are
here concerned with the much larger issue as to the appropriate relationship between
federal and state authorities functioning as a harmonious whole.”84 Delay, moreover,
could count not merely as a cost for the litigant, but also as a benefit to the public
and the federal system.85 Rutledge stated that constitutional avoidance helped to
maintain the authority of the Court, and “the benefits of tolerance and harmony for
the functioning of the various authorities in our scheme;” these interests would be
undermined by “a contrary policy, of accelerated decision.”86
Of course, delay is another name for constitutional avoidance, constitutional
gradualism, and passive virtues—all concepts that the Court continues to rely on to a

Federal court.”); Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 216, 230 (1948) (arguing that actions under the civil rights laws should be excluded
from his proposal of sending all challenges to state laws to state courts for litigation, “not because the
interest of the state is smaller in such cases, but because its interest is outweighed by other factors of the
highest national concern” (footnote omitted)).
80. Rescue Army v. Mun. Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 568–75 (1947); id. at 570 n.34 (citing, inter alia,

Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944)).

81.

Id. at 568.

82. Id. at 571–72; cf. id. at 572 (also noting that an accelerated abstract determination could leave rights

“uncertain and insecure”).

83. See, e.g., Lilienthal, supra note 44, at 416 (noting a number of ways in which the preliminary relief

available in the federal courts was superior to that in state courts); cf. Lockwood et al., supra note 27, at
428–29 (discussing the speed with which plaintiffs could obtain federal court injunctions).

84. 316 U.S. 168, 172–73 (1942); see also Charles Alan Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 Tex.

L. Rev. 815, 818 (1959) (discussing Gov’t & Civil Emps. Org. Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957),
and stating, “One can imagine the frustration which such delay and expense must cause to the parties
involved. But the controlling policy, that a federal court will not decide a constitutional question where
[the] decision can go on other grounds, is of sufficient importance to the whole institution of judicial
review that such expense and delay seem justifiable.”).

85. See Lockwood et al., supra note 27, at 429 (apparently treating the speed of the federal court determination

as a defect, for making it “improbable that contemporaneous litigation” would be heard in the state courts).

86. Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 572.
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certain extent.87 The “delay is good” notion, however, perhaps reached its apex in the
1940s and ’50s. In Government & Civil Employees Organizing Committee v. Windsor,88
for example, the litigants abandoned their constitutional challenges to a state statute
after the Court directed the plaintiffs to resort to the state court for a second time.
The decision shows just how little the interests of the litigants in having their case
promptly decided weighed against the interests of federal-state harmony in the Court’s
balance.89 The Court’s declining jurisdiction in the cases mentioned above, with a
view to giving state courts the chance to limit the challenged state statute to intrastate
commerce, similarly accorded little heft to the regulated party’s interest in a prompt
decision.90
One might think that litigants’ interests in speedy vindication of their rights
might count more in areas where Carolene Products’ Footnote Four suggested a less
retiring role for the federal courts.91 But the Footnote Four taxonomy was not wellestablished in the 1940s, particularly with respect to race cases.92 And while the
political process theory ref lected in Footnote Four was making inroads in First
Amendment cases,93 Frankfurter’s dissent from the Court’s prohibition of compulsory
87.

See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(listing doctrines under which the Court “has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional
questions pressed upon it for decision”).

88. 353 U.S. at 366–67 (after directing plaintiffs to obtain a ruling from the state courts, sending the case

back to state court again because plaintiffs had not asked the state court to consider the act in light of
their constitutional objections). The state act’s prohibition on state workers’ unionization seemed
relatively clear. Id. at 364–65.

89. See Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122

U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071, 1086 n.65 (1974) (discussing the delays in Windsor).

90. The impact might be mitigated by the federal court’s ability to enter a preliminary injunction in Pullman

cases. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 599 (1946). It is unclear how often the
plaintiffs returned to federal courts. See infra text accompanying note 116.

91.

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (suggesting more searching
review for legislation that restricted political processes, such as the right to vote or disseminate
information, that was directed against minorities who might have difficulty influencing the political
process, or that impinged on Bill of Rights protections).

92.

See, e.g., Goluboff, supra note 2, at 45–47 (stating that any new constitutional paradigm suggested by
Carolene Products remained a suggestion in the 1940s and did not govern the Court’s race decisions);
Amar, supra note 3, at 706 (noting that the first edition of Hart & Wechsler did not cite Carolene
Products); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 213,
219–20 (1991) (indicating that the Court invoked the political process theory in a variety of contexts,
including First Amendment cases, but was slow to use the theory in race cases); cf. Lucas A. Powe, Jr.,
The Warren Court and American Politics 215 (2000) (suggesting that the Warren Court was
“not worrying about constitutional theory but rather reaching results that conformed to the values that
enjoyed significant national support in the mid-1960s”); id. at 489 (noting that “only once in Warren’s
sixteen years did an opinion of the Court cite Footnote Four”).

93.

See Klarman, supra note 92, at 224–25 (“Underlying judicial solicitude for free expression was the notion
that legislatures cannot be trusted to afford adequate scope to political speech owing to their vested interest
in stifling criticism of the prevailing regime.”); id. at 225–26 (also noting use of the political process theory
in dormant commerce clause decisions, based on reasoning that legislation would be subjected to lesser
political restraints when its burdens fell on out-of-staters). Political process theory justifies judicial review
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flag-salutes in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette voiced opposition to tiered
scrutiny.94 In addition, the more difficult or divisive the constitutional issue, the
more appropriate avoidance and delay might seem to some justices. Frankfurter thus
reasoned in Pullman that because the race discrimination claim involved “a sensitive
area of social policy,” the federal courts ought not to address the issue “unless no
alternative to its adjudication is open.” 95 Manifesting the same taste for delay,
Frankfurter famously helped to engineer the gradualist approach to desegregation
remedies in Brown v. Board of Education.96 Commentators, moreover, generally have
noted that there has not been a clear “civil liberties” or “civil rights” exception to
abstention.97 Nevertheless, school desegregation and other civil rights cases eventually
would help to undermine the pervasiveness of abstention, not only for civil rights
cases, but for other cases as well.98
III.	LESS DISTINCT CATEGORIES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORE PERVASIVE
DOCTRINE

The Court’s treating state courts as having greater access to social facts, its giving
state courts the opportunity to make unlikely narrowing interpretations, and its
balancing the public interest in delay against the private interest in speedy federal
decisions, all suggested that abstention was at least potentially available in any case
“as an enterprise designed to repair defective processes of participation and representation.” Tribe, supra
note 8, at 1 (characterizing John Hart Ely’s views in Democracy and Distrust (1980)).
94. 319 U.S. 624, 649 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Urofsky, supra note 35, at 183 (discussing

Frankfurter’s Barnette dissent); id. at 189–90 (discussing Frankfurter’s upholding a compulsory f lag
salute in Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), based on his reasoning that the legislative
end was legitimate, and the means chosen reasonable); id. at 191 (discussing Frankfurter’s ordered
liberty approach to applying Bill of Rights protections against the states). But cf. Jaffe, supra note 40, at
401 (indicating that Frankfurter’s Barnette approach was untenable and that Frankfurter seemed not to
follow it in Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948)); id. (indicating that Frankfurter
found a sounder course with his “immutable principles of justice” approach to the Bill of Rights’
applicability to the states).

95. 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941); see also Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949) (abstaining in

a case involving the constitutionality of an Hawaii law restricting foreign language teaching).

96. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and

the Supreme Court 1936–1961, at 192 (1994) (stating that Frankfurter campaigned with other
justices for reargument on remedy in Brown “because deferring [the] decision might lead Congress or
the newly elected President to act”); id. at 195 (noting that Frankfurter’s five questions for reargument
included two as to “whether an equity court might authorize ‘gradual adjustment’”).

97.

See, e.g., Field, supra note 89, at 1131–32 (writing in 1974, indicating that the cases did not generally
support a civil rights exception); Wright, supra note 66, at 170 (noting that Pullman abstention had
even been ordered in actions under the civil rights statutes, although noting that some cases had
accepted Herbert Wechsler’s argument, see infra note 117, that abstention was inappropriate for such
cases). But cf. Frank L. Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance
of Dombrowksi, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 535, 540–41, 566 (1970) (seeing several cases in the early 1960s as
confirming a civil rights exception to abstention, which included First Amendment and race cases).

98. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 3, at 703 (emphasizing Brown as central to undermining the retiring role for

the federal courts reflected in the first Hart & Wechsler).
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challenging state and local regulation. While federal courts were still deciding many
cases challenging state regulation in the 1940s and ’50s,99 a default rule of abstention
might have evolved.100 Abstention, then, might have mimicked substantive review of
economic regulation, where seemingly more fact-bound justifications gave way to
across-the-board deference.
A. Less Distinct Categories

This risk was enhanced by the fact that the specific abstention categories and
criteria were less distinct than they are now,101 and reasoning from what we might now
consider one type of abstention was freely used in others.102 As noted above, while the
“any state of facts” language is sometimes cited as support for Younger abstention,103
99. See Laycock, supra note 7, at 642, 643–44, 649 (detailing cases).
100. See W.F. Young, Jr., Discretion to Deny Federal Relief Against State Action, 28 Tex. L. Rev. 410, 417

(1949) (referring to the “dark hint” from the Court’s “exceptional circumstances” language in Stainback);
see also supra text accompanying note 55.

101. See Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine,

24 F.R.D. 481, 488 (1959) (noting problems with the lack of definition of the abstention doctrine);
Wright, supra note 66, § 52, at 169 (stating in 1963 that there were as many as four doctrines—
Pullman, Burford, possibly one for difficult issues of state law in diversity involving private parties, and
possibly one for the convenience of the federal courts); Field, supra note 89, at 1152, 1154 (writing in
1974, and seeking to delineate the categories, but noting the lack of clarity as to Thibodaux and Burford/
administrative abstention); Young, supra note 100, at 412 (noting that the cases “are not susceptible of
any nice alignment” but fit into “two broad frames” based on the aims “to preserve to state agencies the
enforcement of state policies demanding local evaluation” and “to save waste motion on the part of a
federal court faced with an unsettled point of state law”).
Cases discussing the want of equity, which we would now tend to locate under Younger abstention,
were in a considerable state of disarray. See, e.g., Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 399 (1941) (adverting to the
prohibition on injunctions against enforcement of criminal statutes, but also relying on the lack of any
pending threat of prosecution as a reason to withhold decision in a challenge to Florida’s regulation of
copyrights). See generally Laycock, supra note 7, at 644 (pointing out that the criminal prosecution was no
longer likely in Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), because the Court had held the statute
unconstitutional in a companion case); id. at 642 (indicating that between Ex parte Young and Douglas, the
Court granted injunctions with little mention of distinctions “between injunctions and declaratory
judgments, between criminal and civil proceedings, and between cases with and cases without pending
enforcement proceedings,” nor did the line of cases freely granting injunctions die out thereafter); Hart &
Wechsler I, supra note 16, at 863 (trying to sort cases when injunctions against criminal prosecutions
were denied or allowed). To be sure, the Court did to an extent employ distinctions we now use. See, e.g.,
Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 588–89 (1946) (distinguishing between want of “equity in
the bill” and Pullman); Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 344 (1951) (indicating the case
did not involve construction of an “ill-defined” state statute as in Pullman).

102. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333 & n.29 (1943) (citing Pullman, and other cases where

the Court declined equity jurisdiction).

103. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971) (indicating that this was not a case in which a statute was

“flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and
paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it” (quoting
Watson, 313 U.S. 387)). The Court has been reluctant to find cases within this exception such that the
language continues to be used to support a notion that Younger abstention is the norm with respect to
pending prosecutions. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechlser’s the Federal
Courts and the Federal System 1097–98 (6th ed. 2009).
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such reasoning was also used to support Pullman abstention.104 What is more, in
Stainback, the case challenging Hawaii’s prohibition of foreign-language teaching
(sometimes characterized as a Pullman case),105 the Court dismissed the action rather
than retaining jurisdiction as Pullman calls for.106
Justices who maintained a more pro-abstention stance tended to favor an openended and pervasive doctrine of jurisdictional discretion, rather than a set of limited
categories. In extending abstention to a diversity action at law involving an unsettled
issue of state eminent domain law, for example, Frankfurter stated, “These prior
cases have been cases in equity, but they did not apply a technical rule of equity
procedure. They reflect a deeper policy derived from our federalism.”107
Perhaps a high point for a global policy of withholding a federal court decision
was the Court’s 1947 decision in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles. Los
Angeles had twice before prosecuted Charles T. Murdock, an officer of the religious
group Rescue Army, for failing to obtain a permit to use a box for solicitation and for
failing to display a required information card.108 When the city brought a third action
against Murdock on the same grounds, he and the group sought a writ of prohibition
in the California courts.109 The California Supreme Court upheld the statute’s
constitutionality on the merits. The case seemingly was within the mandatory
appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court.110
The Court, however, declined to hear the appeal; Rutledge treated the state court
action as a declaratory suit and relied, inter alia, on the federal courts’ discretion to
decline to exercise jurisdiction in declaratory actions.111 He characterized the
constitutional issues as abstract,112 although the issues affecting Murdock—the
requirements of a permit for a solicitation box and of an information card—seemed
clear. Rutledge went on for several pages listing doctrines that together manifested the
104. See supra text accompanying notes 61–68.
105. See Wright, supra note 66, at 170 & n.6.
106. Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 383–84 (1949) (remanding with directions to dismiss

the complaint).

107. La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
108. Rescue Army v. Mun. Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1947); id. at 566–68 (concluding there was

jurisdiction but also finding compelling reasons for not exercising it); cf. Alexander M. Bickel, The
Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 46 (1961) (treating the
Court’s dismissals of appeals for want of a substantial federal question as involving a discretionary
denial of seemingly mandatory jurisdiction).

109. Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 552.
110. Id. at 549 (appeal from the California Supreme Court). The California Supreme Court had declined to

determine if the act was unconstitutional as applied. See Rescue Army v. Mun. Court of L.A., 171 P.2d
8, 16–17 (Cal. 1946).

111. Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 574; see also Ala. State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 471 (1945)

(dismissing certiorari based partly on such reasoning); cf. Parker v. Cnty. of L.A., 338 U.S. 327 (1949)
(dismissing certiorari to a state court because it only became clear in another case that the failure to take
the city loyalty oath could lead to discharge, and that case was then pending in the state courts).

112. Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 581–83.
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Court’s “policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues,”113 one that
transcended the particular limitations of particular procedural doctrines114 and that
“cannot be reduced to any precise formula or complete catalogue.”115
B. The Possibility of a More Pervasive Practice

The premise of some of the legislative initiatives following Ex parte Young, and of
writings by Frankfurter and his students in the 1920s and ’30s, was that virtually all
issues of the legality of state and local regulation should go to the state courts in the
first instance—at least where adequate remedies were available in the state courts.
While the Court continued to entertain many challenges to state regulation on
review of federal courts, the trend at mid-century seemed to be going the way of
broader abstention. Writing in 1948, Herbert Wechsler argued that, in abstention
cases, the federal courts’ retention of jurisdiction “is hardly a matter of significance.”116
He stated:
The development described should be extended by the statute to deny original
jurisdiction in all cases that present a claim of federal invalidity in state
legislative or administrative action where, in the language of the present
statute, a “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” is available in the state courts.
There is no reason to exempt from application of this principle the small
residuum of cases to which present limitations may be held inapplicable, as
where state law is not conceived to be uncertain or the constitutional issue is
present in an action that would formerly have been at law. The crucial point is
one of general validity: it is that application of the federal authority to
invalidate the action of a state is best accomplished when the issue finds its
way to the Supreme Court after it has had examining in the state courts.117

A 1950 article noted statements by the Court suggesting it would require “exceptional
circumstances” not to abstain in suits seeking injunctions against state laws.118 And
the 1953 Hart and Wechsler casebook noted various judicially developed doctrines,
and stated that the “delicacy of the jurisdiction sanctioned” in cases such as Ex parte
Young, had become apparent to the Court. “The process appears to be one of a series
113. Id. at 568.
114. Id. at 571.
115. Id. at 573. The doctrines of avoidance that underlay abstention were present when the constitutionality

of federal legislation was at issue as well, although in that context separation of powers concerns replaced
federalism concerns. See id. at 569 n.31 (citing Brandeis’s concurrence in Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936)).

116. Wechsler, supra note 79, at 229; see also Note, Judicial Abstention from the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction,

59 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 776 (1959) (“[I]t seems clear that in practice few such cases return to a district
court.”).

117. Wechsler, supra note 79, at 229. He would have excepted cases under the civil rights laws. Id. at 230.
118. Young, supra note 100, at 417. The language was from Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368,

381 (1949) and is quoted supra text accompanying note 55. “This language, if it is to be credited,” said
Young, “virtually closes the federal courts as an avenue of attack on state statutes. . . . What may be
meant by the dark hint of ‘exceptional circumstances’ is left a guess . . . .”
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of landmark decisions by the Court molding traditional doctrines to meet the
peculiar problems of this jurisdiction and, especially in later years, almost always in
the direction of placing greater restraints on the [federal] district courts.”119
IV.	RESISTANCE

With the benefit of hindsight, we know that neither the Court nor Congress took
the path Wechsler prescribed, and we can trace the developing lines of resistance. On
the one hand, most justices during this period adhered to aspects of sociological
jurisprudence,120 particularly with respect to substantive review of mine-run economic
legislation. On the other hand, several justices, as to both substantive and jurisdictional
methodologies, shared neither the degree of deference to other institutions nor the
taste for incrementalism that characterized such abstention stalwarts as Frankfurter
and John Marshall Harlan.121 For example, Douglas’s versions of substantive review,
compared to Frankfurter’s, used incorporation rather than an ordered liberty approach
to the Bill of Rights,122 more fully embraced high levels of scrutiny for speech,123 and
favored a wider scope for equal protection124 and federal preemption.125 And as to
119. Hart & Wechsler I, supra note 16, at 858.
120. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 10, at lxi (indicating that substantive deference was widely shared on

the Court).

121. See, e.g., Purcell, Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution, supra note 74, at 222 (contrasting

Frankfurter’s emphasis on judicial restraint, deference to other branches, and adherence to judicial
limitations to Black’s more activist stance); McManamon, supra note 11, at 730–32 & n.223 (discussing
the influence on Frankfurter of James Bradley Thayer, who believed legislation should be struck down
only when its unconstitutionality was clear); Urofsky, supra note 35, at 186 (“One can characterize the
division between the Frankfurter and Black/Douglas views in several ways—restraint versus activism,
process versus results . . . .”).

122. See Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 673, 693–94 (1963)

(noting Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge’s agreement with Black’s incorporation views).

123. See, e.g., Urofsky, supra note 35, at 199 (indicating that Black and Douglas argued for treating the speech

clause as having a “preferred” constitutional position, and for a more “absolutist” interpretation of the
First Amendment, while Frankfurter preferred the evaluation and balancing of the “clear and present
danger” test); Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black 295–97 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing Douglas, Black, and
Murphy’s agreement as to preferred freedoms, and Frankfurter’s disagreement).

124. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1947) (Vinson, C.J.) (ruling narrowly, in an opinion joined,

inter alia, by Frankfurter, that California’s prohibiting land ownership by immigrants who were
ineligible for citizenship (Japanese immigrants) violated the equal protection rights of the immigrant’s
son, who was a citizen, and in whose name the father had put title); id. at 647 (Black, J., concurring,
joined by Douglas, J.) (arguing that the Court should decide the broader constitutional question); id. at
650 (Murphy, J., concurring, joined by Rutledge, J.) (similar); cf. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948) (holding that California’s making immigrants who were ineligible for citizenship
ineligible for commercial fishing licenses violated equal protection).

125. See, e.g., Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (Black, J.) (holding, in an opinion joined, inter alia, by

Douglas and Murphy, that the Wagner Act preempted a state law requiring unions and their business
agents to register and pay a one-dollar fee); id. at 548 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
“repugnance” of state law to federal law should be “direct and positive” (citing Sinnot v. Davenport, 63
U.S. 227, 243 (1859))); see also Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480–81 (1955)
(Frankfurter, J.) (stating that the area of labor preemption is “not susceptible of delimitation by fixed
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jurisdictional issues, Douglas unsurprisingly led the opposition to abstention,126
sometimes joined by Frank Murphy,127 and later by Earl Warren and William J.
Brennan.128 Black, however, combined a peremptory substantive style with a fairly proabstention stance.129
A. Discounting the Significance of Local Facts

Preemption cases demonstrated how narrower versus broader substantive
approaches translated into greater and lesser willingness to abstain, through the
metes and bounds” and that the “penumbral area can be rendered progressively clear only by the course
of litigation”); Int’l Union v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd. (Briggs-Stratton), 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (Jackson,
J.) (holding, in an opinion joined, inter alia, by Frankfurter, that there was no preemption of the state’s
injunction against a union’s calling constant union meetings to pressure the employer to enter a
contract); id. at 265 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black & Rutledge, JJ.) (arguing for preemption);
id. at 270 (Murphy, J., dissenting, joined by Rutledge, J.) (same).
126. This is not to say that Douglas never supported abstention. He wrote a few opinions directing abstention

in the 1940s. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942) (requiring abstention
to allow state courts to determine if the ordinance requiring milk to be sold in “standard milk bottles”
would allow sales in the plaintiff ’s paper containers); Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946)
(directing the lower federal court, which had upheld a state right to work law, to abstain under Pullman).
And he did not dissent in a number of abstention cases. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941). He did, however, join Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s opinion declining to abstain in
Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), and by the late 1940s Douglas seemed fairly
resistant to abstention. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (Douglas, J.), discussed
infra text accompanying notes 133–35; cf. Rescue Army v. Mun. Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 585 (1947)
(Murphy, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.), discussed infra text accompanying notes 136–37. This
resistance continued in the 1950s. See, e.g., Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321, 322 (1950) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting alone from the Court’s ordering abstention to allow the state court to construe the
state statute regulating fishing that plaintiffs claimed allowed administrative forfeiture without a judicial
hearing); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (dissenting
alone from holding a federal action filed by the United States in abeyance while a parallel state court action
determined a state mineral rights question); Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237,
251–52 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (dissenting alone from the majority’s declining to hear a declaratory
judgment action); id. (arguing that there was a sufficient threat to the plaintiff ’s business by the state’s
regulation of transportation of films and newsreels). But cf. Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970)
(Douglas, J.) (holding that the federal courts should abstain pending state court determination of the
constitutionality of the statute under the state constitutional provision relating to fishing).

127. See, e.g., Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 585 (Murphy, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.) (dissenting from

the majority’s declining to decide the case on direct review); see also Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Watson, 327
U.S. 582, 606 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should decide the merits of the
state right to work law rather than abstain); cf. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Denver Milk Prods., 334 U.S.
809 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Murphy, J.) (dissenting from the Court’s declining to hear an
appeal from a state judgment reinstating a suit for an injunction against picketers).

128. See Kurland, supra note 101, at 488 (noting that Douglas was “most vehement” against the use of

abstention, with Warren and Brennan “not far behind”).

129. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (Black, J.); see also text accompanying notes 50–52. Of

course Black sometimes opposed abstention. See, e.g., Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242, 245 (1953)
(Black, J., dissenting, joined by Murphy, J.) (dissenting from abstention with respect to a state
communist control bill); cf. Reich, supra note 122, at 723–25 (indicating that Black was not a proponent
of constitutional avoidance).
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medium of whether a justice believed that local problems might justify a statute or
that narrowing rulings would save the law.130 In California Public Utilities Commission
v. United States, for example, Douglas garnered a majority for immediately
invalidating state legislation that would have allowed the state Commission to
regulate the rates the federal government paid for intrastate railroad service, reasoning
that “[t]he conflict seems to us to be as clear as any that the Supremacy Clause . . .
was designed to resolve.”131 Harlan’s dissent, by contrast, argued that the California
law responded to the local problem of military rates depressing carrier profits, and
that the Court should withhold any preemption decision until construction and
implementation of the statute showed the effect on federal interests.132 Similarly in
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, Douglas’s majority opinion rejected abstention133 and held
that the United States Warehouse Act should be read to preempt state warehouse
regulation based on a test of “whether the matter on which the State asserts the right
to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.”134 By contrast, Frankfurter, in
dissent, would have looked for actual conflict or perhaps direct overlays, such that
the Court should await authoritative interpretation by the state court that might
avoid such conflict.135
B. Declining to Imagine State Narrowing Interpretations

Those disinclined to abstain, moreover, resisted hypothesizing potential state court
narrowing interpretations pursuant to any state of facts reasoning. In Rescue Army, for
example, Murphy, joined by Douglas in dissent, argued sensibly that the Court’s refusal
to decide the religious solicitation case on direct review to await state court clarification
130. Cf. Bickel, supra note 108, at 53, 56 (discussing Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961),

and suggesting that if one held the view that any prior restraint is unconstitutional, then one would be
less likely to see a challenge to a licensing scheme that the plaintiff declined to utilize as too abstract for
immediate decision).

131. 355 U.S. 534, 544 (1958).
132. Id. at 546, 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J. & Burton, J.).
133. 331 U.S. 218, 231–34 (1947) (rejecting the argument that the decision should await action by the Illinois

Commission to see if the Commission determinations ran counter to federal policy); see also id. at 230
(laying out a general assumption that “the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded . . . unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”); id. at 234 (finding such a
clear purpose).

134. Id. at 236; see also City of Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 357 U.S. 77, 84–85 (1958)

(Black, J.) (holding that federal commerce acts preempted a city’s requiring a certificate of convenience
for an inter-terminal transportation company formed at the request of the railroads, and rejecting
abstention); id. at 91 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Frankfurter & Burton, JJ.) (arguing that the case
for preemption was unclear and that the decision should await the city’s action under its ordinance). But
cf. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. at 236–37 (noting three matters that the federal act did not cover, and
that as to those matters any conflict could be addressed if it arose); Rice v. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 331
U.S. 247, 256 (1947) (Douglas, J.) (holding unanimously, on certiorari from the lower federal court, that
the federal commodities act did not supersede all state regulation, and that any specific claims of
supersedure could be preserved in state proceedings).

135. See Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. at 239 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, joined by Rutledge, J.).
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of state law was unwarranted; the constitutionality of the city’s requirements to obtain
a permit to use a solicitation box, and to display an information card, had been decided
by the court below.136 Similarly, in Albertson v. Millard, Douglas dissented from the
Court’s holding in abeyance a federal action challenging the Michigan communist
control bill, pointing out the lack of uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff would be
required to register under the act.137
C. A Duty to Exercise Federal Jurisdiction

The broad view that Douglas and other abstention resisters had as to preferred
federal rights generally extended to rights of litigants to invoke federal jurisdictional
statutes in both diversity and federal question cases. As noted above, Frankfurter and
Charles Warren sought to banish notions that federal jurisdiction was a right—
particularly a constitutional one—and encouraged a liberal use of discretion to
decline jurisdiction that was statutorily conferred. Abstention resisters, by contrast,
argued that litigants had at least statutory rights to a federal forum and that the
federal district courts had a corresponding “duty” to entertain congressionally
conferred jurisdiction. The right-duty argument got early traction in diversity, where
the problems of determining state law seemed inherent to the constitutional and
statutory grants.138 Douglas, Brennan, and Earl Warren would help reinforce a duty
as to federal questions139—particularly for cases under the civil rights acts.140 Douglas,
136. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Mun. Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549, 585 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting, joined

by Douglas, J.); cf. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting,
joined by Reed & Burton, JJ.) (dissenting as to the majority’s finding standing lacking).

137. 345 U.S. 242, 245–46 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (reasoning that it was clear that the act covered

the Communist Party, that the plaintiff was a member, and that the act required registration and
forbade appearance on ballots); cf. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957) (ordering
the federal court to hold a U.S.-a-party action in abeyance, to await state court determination of whether
the state’s 1940 statute purporting—as against the United States—to disallow prescription of a prior
owner’s mineral rights, applied to a 1938 deed preserving the vendor’s mineral rights only until 1945);
id. at 230 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (arguing it was improper to hold the U.S.-a-party action in
abeyance); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 214–15 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by
Warren, C.J. & Douglas, J.) (arguing that state law issues were clear and opposing the majority’s referral
to state court—possibly by certification).

138. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943) (Stone, C.J.) (stating that deciding state

law issues was necessary to diversity jurisdiction); id. at 236 (stating that the difficulty or uncertainty of
the state law issue did not preclude the federal court’s deciding it); cf. La. Power & Light v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 32 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J. & Douglas, J.)
(arguing that the decision was inconsistent with the “imperative duty” imposed under the district court
by diversity and removal statutes).

139. See Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 229 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from abstention in a

case where the plaintiffs claimed a taking through loss of highway access, and arguing that federal
courts should be responsible for the exposition of federal law); see also Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472,
491–92 (1949) (Reed, J.) (declining abstention where a state law issue bore on a federal statutory issue).

140. See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 181 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J.

& Brennan, J.) (“It seems plain to me that it was the District Court’s duty to provide this remedy, if the
appellees, who invoked that court’s jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act” showed they were deprived
of civil rights provided by the Constitution); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247–48 (1967) (Brennan,
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for example, invoked against abstention the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 that “[a]ll
persons . . . shall have the same right in every State . . . to sue . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens.”141
V. EMPHASIZING SPECIFIC CATEGORIES AND THE DECLINE OF ABSTENTION

A. Special Circumstances Required to Abstain

If there were a general duty of lower federal courts to exercise jurisdiction, then
abstention should be reserved for “special circumstances,”142 countering suggestions
noted above that special circumstances might be required not to abstain in cases
challenging state and local regulation. A requirement of special circumstances for
abstention was reinforced by enumeration of specific doctrines rather than alluding to
a general policy of avoidance and federalism. In Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, for
example, Stone refused to abstain in a diversity case merely because the state law issue
was difficult, and attempted to show that exceptional circumstances were required for
the federal courts to decline jurisdiction.143 His nearly two-page catalogue of such
circumstances, however, seemed to undermine his claim that the circumstances were
exceptional.144 Brennan would later provide shorter enumerations,145 thereby reinforcing
the notion of abstention as extraordinary and not subject to case-by-case balancing.
Even when a case fell within an established category, abstention-induced delay
began to weigh more heavily against abstention. Commentators noted that the
Spector case146 —in which the Court abstained because the state might possibly
interpret its tax to apply only to intrastate commerce—took nearly a decade to
resolve.147 And in the school desegregation cases, abstention-caused delay proved to
J.) (stating that in expanding federal judicial power with the civil rights acts and the 1875 act, “Congress
imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor’s choice of a
federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims”).
141. Harrison, 360 U.S. at 180.
142. See, e.g., Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949) (Reed, J.) (rejecting abstention in a federal statutory

case and stating that the “special circumstances” of cases such as Pullman were absent); Cnty. of
Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959) (Brennan, J.) (indicating that the doctrine
of abstention is an “extraordinary and narrow exception” to the duty to adjudicate); Zwickler, 389 U.S. at
248 (Brennan, J.) (indicating that for federal constitutional claims, exceptions are only for “narrowly
limited ‘special circumstances’” (citing Propper, 337 U.S. at 492)).

143. 320 U.S. 228, 235–36 (1943).
144. Id.
145. La. Power & Light v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by

Warren, C.J. & Douglas, J.) (describing categories as mooting or changing the posture of a federal
constitutional issue, disrupting a state administrative process, or otherwise creating needless friction);
Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. at 188–89 (1959) (Brennan, J.) (listing categories); Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814–17 (1976) (Brennan, J.) (enumerating categories,
although abstaining in a case that he concluded did not fit those categories).

146. Spector Motor Servs. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944), discussed supra text accompanying note 62.
147. See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 101, at 489 (noting the delay problem in cases such as Spector, and suggesting

a more appropriate solution would be to have the state court pronounce on both the state and federal
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be a tool for resistance. Jack Greenberg, writing in 1959, noted that “resistance by all
lawful means” included “legislating and relegislating to establish a body of laws,
which, it is asserted, must first be construed or invalidated before federal rights can
be enjoyed.”148 “It is a common defense tactic in segregation cases,” he stated, “to urge
that the cause should first be heard in the state courts.” 149 In the Arkansas
desegregation case Cooper v. Aaron, the entire Court joined an opinion renouncing
delay by abstention.150 The district court had put off implementing a desegregation
plan in light of resistance, but also to allow completion of state court review of state
legislation.151 The Court stated:
We are urged to uphold a suspension of the Little Rock School Board’s plan
to do away with segregated public schools in Little Rock until state laws and
efforts to upset and nullify our holding in Brown v. Board of Education have
been further challenged and tested in the courts. We reject these contentions.152

B. Mixed Results; Then Decline of Abstention

While the beginning of the 1950s suggested to commentators a trend toward
having nearly all federal challenges to state and local laws go to state trial courts,153
the results were more mixed by the end of the decade. Some saw cases such as Cooper
as portending a lesser role for abstention.154 Other commentators assumed that
abstention would remain robust155—an assumption reinforced by four decisions
handed down on the same day in 1959 that at once highlighted divisions on the Court,
but also suggested that the abstention doctrine would retain substantial vigor.156 On
question); Hart & Wechsler I, supra note 16, at 870 (noting that the plaintiffs secured a decision nine
years after the action commenced).
148. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 61.
149. Id.
150. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
151. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark.), rev’d, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.), aff ’d, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
152. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4; see also Greenberg, supra note 3, at 9–10 (writing in 1959 and seeing federal

judges as less tolerant of evasion in school cases).

153. See supra text accompanying notes 116–19.
154. 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see also Greenberg, supra note 3, at 63 & n.119 (referring also to Pub. Utils. Comm’n

of Cal. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958), City of Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 357
U.S. 77 (1958), and several lower court desegregation cases as moving away from finding state law
ambiguous); cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
9 (1959) (discussing a duty to take jurisdiction conferred).

155. Charles E. Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States’ Rights; to a More Perfect Union, 40 Tex. L. Rev.

211, 221 (1961) (criticizing expansions of abstention and its near-mandatory nature); Kurland, supra
note 101, at 491 (suggesting a solution that the first filed action should proceed with the entire case); see
also Note, supra note 116, at 776–78 (suggesting greater weight to the statutory obligation to take
jurisdiction and also arguing for making the doctrine more predictable).

156. See Kurland, supra note 101, at 481–87 (discussing these cases, all handed down on June 8, 1959); Note,

Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 226 (1959) (same).
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the one hand, the Court in Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co.157 adhered to the
Court’s earlier decision in Meredith158 that resisted, in a diversity case, a blanket
eminent domain exclusion. But the Court extended abstention to a diversity action at
law involving the scope of a city’s eminent domain power in Thibodaux,159 and also
ordered abstention in a takings case to determine if the state considered highway
access to be property.160 And in Harrison v. NAACP, in which the NAACP challenged
Virginia barratry statutes aimed at the organization’s desegregation activities, a
majority opinion by Harlan required the plaintiffs first to seek an authoritative
interpretation of the law in the Virginia courts, stating “we are unable to agree that
the terms of these three statutes leave no reasonable room for a construction by the
Virginia courts” that might obviate or change a federal decision.161
The apparent advantage for abstention, however, would quickly reverse. Judicial
restraint famously declined in the 1960s,162 signaled in part by the Court’s expansive
interpretation of the scope of § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape.163 As a substantive matter, the
Court accelerated the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights criminal procedure
guarantees,164 and extended First Amendment protections.165 Both scholars and the
Court would employ Carolene Products’ Footnote Four to support the Court’s
desegregation cases, thereby helping to consolidate two-tiered equal protection
157. 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
158. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
159. 360 U.S. 25 (1959); see also Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960) (indicating that the

lower federal court should obtain a state court determination of state law, possibly by certification).

160. Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 220 (1959); see also City of Meridian v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S.

639 (1959) (ordering abstention when the utility claimed a violation of the contracts clause by the city’s
requirement that it pay two percent of its monthly service charges as compensation for use of streets).

161. 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959); see also NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959) (per curiam) (noting, while

remanding for consideration in light of Harrison, that reference to state courts for construction should
not “automatically be made”); id. (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J. & Brennan, J.)
(arguing that the district “court should be directed to pass on the constitutional issues”); Note, supra
note 156, at 236–37 (seeing as significant the Court’s indication that abstention as to unconstrued state
law would not be automatic); Tushnet, supra note 96, at 275–76 (discussing Harrison, and Frankfurter’s
attempt to keep Douglas from dissenting). But cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520
(1959) (upholding a commerce clause challenge to a mud flap regulation).

162. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Brennan, J.) (rejecting a political question bar to a challenge

to apportionment); id. at 266–67 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan, J.); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that “both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned
on a population basis”); id. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

163. 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (Douglas, J.) (holding that a government official’s acts that violated state law

nevertheless could be under color of state law for purposes of § 1983); id. at 237 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that § 1983 only addressed constitutional violations authorized by state law or custom).

164. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment

violations to the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963) (recognizing a right to
counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment for indigent defendants); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
147–50 (1968) (enumerating Bill of Rights guarantees that now applied to the states, and noting that the
“Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance” in giving content to due process).

165. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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scrutiny,166 and the Court extended heightened scrutiny to new classifications.167 The
Court’s already evident impatience with Southern resistance to desegregation,
moreover, only increased.168
Frankfurter’s 1962 retirement169 would mark dramatic setbacks for abstention, as
noted by contemporary and later commentators.170 David Currie’s 1968 Federal
Courts casebook listed a series of early 1960s cases where the Court explicitly rejected
arguments for abstention,171 including two school desegregation cases,172 a
reapportionment case,173 a foreign commerce case,174 and a First Amendment case.175
In these cases, the Douglas-style abstention resisters’ arguments prevailed. The
Court reasoned that state law was sufficiently clear such that there was no need to
166. Goluboff, supra note 2, at 264 (stating that Louis Pollack invoked Footnote Four in Racial

Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959) to respond
to Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1959));
id. (stating that Pollock’s theory would eventually be embraced by the Court, the Bar, and the legal
academy); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972) (“The Warren
Court embraced a rigid two-tier attitude.”).

167. Gunther, supra note 166, at 8 (noting that the 1960s saw judicial intervention under equal protection

extend well beyond race, and that “[t]he familiar signals of ‘suspect classification’ and ‘fundamental
interest’ came to trigger the occasions for the new interventionist stance”).

168. See The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 179, 187 (1964) (noting impatience); id. at 187–88

(discussing that NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964), was the Court’s “fourth decision
concerning Alabama’s attempt to exclude the [NAACP] from the state”); id. at 189 (discussing Griffin
v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), which indicated that the federal court below might order the
defendant to raise taxes sufficient to reopen closed schools).

169. See Powe, supra note 92, at 209–13 (indicating that what the public calls the Warren Court coincided

more or less with Frankfurter’s 1962 retirement, which gave Douglas, Warren, Black, and Brennan a
reliable liberal fifth vote with Arthur Goldberg, shortly after replaced by Abe Fortas); id. at 498 (noting
that some placed the transformation as starting between 1960 and 1961); Michael E. Parrish, Felix
Frankfurter, the Progressive Tradition, and the Warren Court, in The Warren Court in Historical
and Political Perspective 54 (Mark Tushnet ed. 1993) (“Frankfurter’s retirement and replacement
by Arthur Goldberg in the summer of 1962 gave Warren a dependable fifth vote and opened the most
militant chapter in the Court’s defense of civil liberties and civil rights.”).

170. See, e.g., Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter’s Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 Harv. L.

Rev. 604, 604 (1967) (stating that Frankfurter’s retirement left the abstention doctrine a “ judicial
orphan,” and discussing the quick turn in the case law); Burton D. Wechsler, Federal Courts, State
Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 740, 831 (1974) (“The Court’s interest in
Pullman abstention . . . drastically declined in the early sixties . . . .”).

171. David P. Currie, Federal Courts 510–14 (1968); see also David P. Currie, Federal Courts 658

(2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter Currie II] (noting that the “abstention doctrine was thought to have gone
into something of a decline in the mid-1960’s” and that in “each of the seven cases passing on abstention
between 1962 and 1967, the Supreme Court managed to distinguish Pullman and avoid abstention”).

172. McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
173. Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964).
174. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
175. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
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resort to state courts.176 Indeed, to the extent that the overbreadth-vagueness doctrine
gained traction in First Amendment cases, the uncertainty of state law would become
an affirmative reason for the federal courts to take jurisdiction.177 And as opposed to
earlier, more expansive notions of jurisdictional discretion, the federal courts were
said to have a duty to take jurisdiction, particularly in civil rights cases.178 The Court
in these cases found no “special circumstances” that would mitigate such a duty.179
Delay, once seen as serving the public interest, was now seen as a disadvantage to
both the litigant and the public interest.180
VI. CONCLUSION

The 1960s did not extinguish abstention completely.181 Nevertheless, that decade
saw the fading importance of abstention and some of the strands of reasoning that
had supported its broad reach. One occasionally sees reference to local facts as a
reason for Burford abstention,182 but there is little remaining conviction that state
176. See Griffin, 377 U.S. at 229 (“[T]he Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has already passed upon the

state law with respect to all the issues here.”); Davis, 377 U.S. at 690 (indicating that state law was
unambiguous). The Court also indicated that unclear issues of state law did not necessarily require
abstention. See Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 327–29 (agreeing with the court below that further delay of the
case was unwarranted, despite questions as to whether the state courts would treat the state law as
applicable in a free-trade zone); Baggett, 377 U.S. at 375 (“The abstention doctrine is not an automatic
rule applied whenever a federal court is faced with a doubtful issue of state law . . . .”).

177. See Baggett, 377 U.S. at 375–76 (“We doubt . . . that a construction of the oath provisions, in light of the

vagueness challenge, would avoid or fundamentally alter the constitutional issue raised in this ligation.”);
see also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489–90 (1965) (Brennan, J.) (“We hold the abstention
doctrine is inappropriate for cases such as the present one where . . . statutes are justifiably attacked on
their face as abridging free expression, or as applied for purposes of discouraging protected activities.”).

178. See McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963) (“Such [Fourteenth Amendment] claims are

entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts.” (footnote omitted)); see also Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 534–35 (1965) (Warren, C.J.) (indicating in a voting case that if the state statute was not fairly
subject to an interpretation that would modify or obviate the need to decide the federal question, then
the court had a duty to exercise its jurisdiction (citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375–79 (1964))).

179. Baggett, 377 U.S. at 375 (“Those special circumstances are not present here.”); McNeese, 373 U.S. at 674

(emphasizing the lack of issues of local law); id. at 673 & n.5 (acknowledging, however, that the “variations
on the theme [of abstention] have been numerous”); cf. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 329 (noting that “there was here
no danger that a federal decision would work a disruption of an entire legislative scheme of regulation”).

180. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 229 (“The case has been delayed since 1951 by resistance at the state and county

level, by legislation, and by lawsuits.”); Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 329 (agreeing with the district court that
abstention would cause further delays in a case where three-judge-court issues, see id. at 327 & n.4, had
already caused delay); Baggett, 377 U.S. at 374, 379 (reasoning that abstention would cause delays in the
free dissemination of ideas); see also Harman, 389 U.S. at 537 (given the election context, and the delay
abstention would cause, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying abstention).

181. See, e.g., Fallon et al., supra note 103, at 1065 (noting a decline of Pullman abstention in the 1960s, a

resurgence with the Burger Court, followed by a decline in the Court but continued use in the lower
federal courts); see also Currie II, supra note 171, at 659–60 (noting 1970s cases where the Court
abstained, but also noting limits).

182. See, e.g., Wilson v. Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 8 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1993) (abstaining under

Burford, inter alia, because the issue “would require delving into highly local issues of fact”).
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courts have superior access to social facts than federal courts.183 The federal courts
may refuse jurisdiction in Younger cases if the contested legislation might
constitutionally be applied to some state of facts, but obscure possibilities that state
courts will narrow a plain statute are not grounds for Pullman abstention. And while
balancing litigants’ rights and governmental interests produced the abstention
doctrines, most jurisdictional questions are determined categorically based on federal
courts’ duty to exercise the jurisdiction given.
Because abstention doctrines remain a potential barrier to litigants challenging
state and local regulation, it is easy to forget how much greater an obstruction they
once posed. Modern civil rights cases could fully take the stage—the federal forum—
by pushing these doctrines into the wings.

183. Purcell, supra note 1, at 714 (“Frankfurter’s corollary idea that state courts should hear federal claims

that were ‘essentially local’ provided little if any useful guidance.”).
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